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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Kurds are the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Turkey.” 1
Kurds are perceived as a threat to Turkish national unity. Turkey has
suppressed many attempts by the Kurds to ameliorate the protection of their
human rights and stifled any plight for the recognition of their minority
rights. The Kurds have no friends. Today’s great powers, as those of
yesterday, benefit from a status quo that maintains the Kurds in their
helpless position. My purpose in this paper is to argue for changing this
status quo.
This paper will first introduce who the Kurds are and the area they
inhabit to establish that the Kurds are a distinct group separate to the
Turkish, Persian and Arab nations that occupied them. The distinctiveness
of Kurds is a fundamental notion underlying the right to self-determination.
Second, the treatment of Kurds by the Turkish Government will be detailed.
In doing so, this paper recognises the lack of accountability and systemic
culture of oppression that underscores the reality for Kurds in Turkey.
The third section will adopt a human rights law analysis to elucidate
the existing safeguards for minority rights and the right to selfdetermination under international law. Section four will then highlight the
failure of Turkish law to comply with the aforementioned international
standards to protect Kurdish rights as a minority group and to recognise
their claim to self-determination. To date, Turkey has prioritised a unitary

1.
Turkey-Kurds, MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT’L: WORLD DIRECTORY MINORITIES &
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, http://minorityrights.org/minorities/kurds-2/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
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state approach leading to the disenfranchisement of Kurds and the persistent
violation of their fundamental rights.2
The fifth section will employ a legal analysis of the right to selfdetermination under international law and articulate the necessary tests and
criteria for a successful claim to self-determination by a group. The
concept of a distinct group, a minority and indigenous peoples will then be
discussed.
The sixth section of this paper will address Turkey’s stance on selfdetermination and will then apply self-determination to Kurds. By claiming
their right to self-determination, Kurds can effectively combat the systemic
oppression and abuse of their fundamental rights by Turkey. Indeed, this
paper determines that Kurds need to have an active role in their governance,
which places them at the centre as champions of change. The final section
recommends a strategy for the Kurds in Bakur to gradually achieve an
independent Kurdistan through the “earned sovereignty” approach.
II.

WHO ARE THE KURDS?

“Kurdun heval ninin bes ciya ([t]he Kurds have no friends but the
mountains).”3 Before embarking on an analysis of the problem in issue,
what is meant by the “Kurds” and “Kurdistan” must be defined and used
consistently throughout this paper. This section also demonstrates that
Kurds are a distinct group who, by virtue of their distinctness, have rights
as a separate group and have a claim to self-determination.4
A.

Historical Characteristics

In the ancient lands of Mesopotamia in the Middle East, there exists a
geographical region where the Kurds form a prominent majority—
Kurdistan. Kurdistan encompasses the area from the southern end of the
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and the Northern Zagros and Eastern Taurus
mountain ranges.5

2.
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VIOLATIONS OF FREE EXPRESSION IN TURKEY
(1999) (providing an example of the Kurds’ fundamental rights being violated through suppression).
3.
ROBERT L. BRENNEMAN, AS STRONG AS THE MOUNTAINS: A KURDISH CULTURAL
JOURNEY 58 (2007).
4.
Ieva Vezbergaite, Self-Determination of the Kurdish People: Undermining the Unity of
the «Turkish Nation»?, 3 (Univ. of Fribourg, Working Paper No. 9, 2015).
5.
See Where is “Kurdistan”?, KURDISH PROJECT, https://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistanmap/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2017).
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Kurds, who are of Aryan descent, are a unique ethnic group distinct
from the neighbouring Arabs, Persians and Turks.6 The Kurds speak their
own language deriving from the Iranian branch of the Indo-European group
of languages. 7 An independent Kurdistan has long been the dream of
Kurds.
B.

Twentieth Century Treatment

The triumph over the Ottoman Empire during the First World War led
to the creation of the modern Middle East by the Allies. 8 In 1920, the
Ottoman Empire and the United Kingdom stipulated the Treaty of Sèvres,
which assured Kurdish independence.9
However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s victory at the Turkish War of
Independence barred the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Allies
reneged on their promise of Kurdish independence.10 In 1923, the Treaty of
Sèvres was nullified and the Treaty of Lausanne superseded, containing no
reference to Kurdistan. 11 Atatürk’s nationalist movement led to the
occupation of the Kurdish regions and the region was split between the four
newly emerged states—Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Persia (now Iran). 12
However, the Kurds have not acquiesced to domination quietly. Since the

6.
History: Who Are the Kurds, and Where Do They Live?, ROJAVA SOLIDARITY SEATTLE,
https://www.rojavasolidarityseattle.com/history (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
7.

Id.

8.
Philip Mansel, The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, HIST. TODAY,
http://www.historytoday.com/philip-mansel/great-powers-and-end-ottoman-empire (last visited Oct. 29,
2017).
9.
Chris Trueman, The Treaty of Sevres, HIST. LEARNING SITE (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.
historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/the-treaty-of-sevres/; Treaty of Sèvres,
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Sevres (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
10.

Trueman, supra note 9.

11.

Treaty of Sèvres, supra note 9; N.Y. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, THE
TREATIES OF PEACE 1919–1923 959–1022 (vol. 2 1924) (referencing art. 39) [hereinafter Treaty of
Lausanne].
12.
GEORGE BLACK, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE KURDS 24 (1993); Nick Danforth, Stop Blaming Colonial Borders for the Middle East's
Problems, ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/stopblaming-colonial-borders-for-the-middle-easts-problems/279561/ (stating that some Kurdish and Middle
Eastern commentators have recognised that these borders were drawn arbitrarily and without
consideration of the traditional boundaries of the region).
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early 1920s, there have been a myriad of Kurdish rebellions in Bakur:
Koçkiri, Sheikh Said, Dersim, and Ararat.13
In 1927, the Kurds, backed by the United Kingdom (U.K.), declared
independence and formed the ‘Republic of Ararat’.14 However, this selfproclaimed state was short-lived and the Turkish military conquered it in
1930.15 Between 1937 and 1938, an estimated 50,000–70,000 Kurds were
killed and thousands were exiled in a dire crackdown on Kurdish
rebellion.16
C.

The Kurds Today

Today, Kurdistan comprises a region partitioned between four
different sovereign nations—northern Iraq (‘Bashur’), southeastern Turkey
(‘Bakur’), northwestern Iran (‘Rojhalat’) and northeastern Syria
(‘Rojava’).17
Kurds, estimated to have a population of approximately 25–30 million
people, are the world’s largest ethnic group without a state. 18 Kurdistan
remains divided by the repressive colonialism of these states who have
stifled any attempts by the Kurds of securing freedom against domination
and their struggles for the recognition of minority rights.19 The Kurds have
endlessly “faced oppression, discrimination, assimilation, ethnic cleansing
and genocide” at the hands of their oppressors.20 As encapsulated cogently,
“the Kurds are one of the most persecuted minorities of our time.”21

13.
Robert Olson, The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), and
Dersim (1937–38): Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and
Turkish Nationalism, 40 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 67, 67 (2000).
14.
FACTS ON FILE LIBRARY OF WORLD HISTORY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PEOPLES OF
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 385 (Jamie Stokes ed. 2009).
15.

Id.

16.
DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 209 (I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 3d
ed. 2004); Ruwayda Mustafah, Why Did Erdogan Apologise for the Dersim Massacre?, HUFFPOST:
WORLDPOST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ruwayda-mustafah/why-did-erdogan-apologise_b_11137
32.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
17.
18.
ed. 2011).

See Appendix 1 for a contemporary map of Kurdistan.
MICHAEL M. GUNTER, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE KURDS 1 (Jon Woronoff ed., 2d

19.
See THE CTR. OF HALABJA AGAINST ANFALIZATION & GENOCIDE OF THE KURDS
(CHAK), “ANFAL”: THE IRAQI STATE’S GENOCIDE AGAINST THE KURDS 7 (2007) [hereinafter Chak].
20.

Id.

21.
Dominique Callimanopulos, Kurdish Repression in Turkey, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q.
MAG. (June 1982), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/kurdishrepression-turkey.
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I believe that the current state of Kurdish populations continues the
oppression of the Kurds by occupying colonialist states which denies their
fundamental rights. This paper will thus seek to remedy this situation and
argue the case for Kurdish self-determination.
III.

KURDS IN TURKEY

“The Turks are the only lords of this country, its only owners. Those
who are not of pure Turkish stock have in this country only one right, that
of being servants, of being slaves. Let friend and foe, and even the
mountains know this truth!”22
Kurds are the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Turkey and “are
concentrated in [the] provinces of the southeast, the same [region] that their
ancestors inhabited . . . in fifth century B.C.” 23 Although there are no
accurate statistics on Kurdish populations, as Turkish censuses do not
identify Kurds as a separate ethnic group, it is estimated that half of the
world’s Kurdish population are located in Turkey.24 Due to the size of the
Kurds in Turkey, they are perceived as the ultimate threat to Turkish
national unity and have been subject to various efforts to thwart their
progress. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to understand how
Kurds are treated in Turkey. In doing so, I highlight that because of such
treatment, the case for self-determination of Kurds is urgent.
A.

Historical Treatment & Movements of Kurds in Turkey

Since the aftermath of the First World War, “Kurds in Turkey have
been the victims of persistent [abuses] of their linguistic, ethnic, cultural,
religious, economic and political rights by successive Turkish
Governments.”25
In an attempt to eradicate all vestige of Kurdish existence, extreme
measures were adopted in the 1920s. In 1924, a “mandate [outlawed]
Kurdish schools, organisations and publications,” the use and teaching of
the Kurdish language entirely and the wearing of Kurdish dress as part of a
policy of compulsory assimilation. 26 All “Kurdish insignia were

22.
Martin van Bruinessen, Genocide in Kurdistan?: The Suppression of the Dersim
Rebellion in Turkey (1937–38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988), in GENOCIDE:
CONCEPTUAL & HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 141, 154 (George Andreopoulos ed., 1994).
23.
Eric Hooglund, The Society and Its Environment, in TURKEY: A COUNTRY STUDY 71, 98
(Helen Chapin Metz ed., 5th ed. 1996).
24.

Id.

25.

Callimanopulos, supra note 21.

26.

Id.
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outlawed.”27 The Turkish Government (the Government) even banned the
words “Kurds,” “Kurdistan,” and “Kurdish” from usage and the Kurdish
language was banned by law. 28 The mere acknowledgement of Kurdish
existence was illegal.29
Kurdish language suppression has been one of the Government's key
strategies for assimilating the Kurds.30 The use of Kurdish was deemed a
threat to Turkey’s unity and indivisibility and the use of the Kurdish
language has historically been perceived as a sign of separatist intentions.31
The Government perceived that the use of Kurdish language would
strengthen the identity of Kurds, increasing moves towards separatism and
threatening political unity.32 It has been argued that speaking one’s mothertongue language is an important component linked to the manifestation of
one’s identity, a sense of belonging and affiliation as identity is embodied
in language, culture and tradition.33
Turkey demonstrated a deliberate intent to destroy Kurds, as
evidenced by the policy of assimilation directed at them and their language.
The policy should be more appropriately termed ethnocide—the eradication
of Kurdish ethnic identity. 34 The Government categorised Kurds as
“Mountain Turks.” 35
Ismet Inonü, former President of Turkey,
encapsulated the attitude towards Kurds when he publicly announced, “We
shall, at any price, Turkicize those who live in our country, and destroy
those who rise up against the Turks and Turkdom.” 36 Notwithstanding
vigorous attempts over a long period to disseminate the Turkish language

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.
Michael Chittenden, Turkey and the Kurds: Conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
and Implications for Turkey-United States Relations, GLOBAL SECURITY STUD., Summer 2016, at 31,
32.
31.
Culture and Language Rights – Mother-Tongue Education in the Kurdish Regions,
KURDISH HUM. RTS. PROJECT 1, 8 (July 2011), http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_66/documentos/
Mother%20Tongue%20Education%20in%20Kurdish%20Regions.%20KHRP%20Briefing%20Paper.%
20July%202011.pdf [hereinafter Mother-Tongue Education].
32.

Id. at 12.

33.

Id. at 11.

34.
Genocide and Ethnocide, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/socialsciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/genocide-and-ethnocide#B (last visited Oct. 29,
2017).
35.

YASEMIN ÇELIK, CONTEMPORARY TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 3 (1999).

36.

van Bruinessen, supra note 22, at 151.
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amongst the Kurds, a majority of Kurds have preserved their native
tongue.37
The Kurds have sought the inclusion of Kurdish as a language of
instruction and as a subject in public schools.38 Presently, Kurdish is still
prohibited as a language of instruction in both public and private schools
but is allowed in some schools as a subject.39 The freedom to use mother
tongue language by minority groups is an essential means for expressing
their cultural identity, yet, as illustrated in this section, the Kurds were
repeatedly bereft of this right.
B.

Kurds as A Minority Group in Turkey

The recognition of a group as a minority is pivotal to the rights and
protection they are afforded. This section aims to elucidate Turkey’s
approach to the identification and status of Kurds as a minority group,
legally and politically. The failure to recognise Kurds as a minority
contributes to the ongoing human rights violations by Turkey and thus selfdetermination is the best solution to ensure their protection as a minority
group.
While the genesis of the conflict between the state and Kurds stems
from the Ottoman era, the political and legal underpinning of Turkey’s
stance pertinent to their Kurdish minority arose in the start of the
Republican epoch.40 From its inception, the Republic of Turkey built a new
state ideology to shape a modern nation on European premises of a single
secular national identity.41 The notion of Turkish identity was premised on
social and cultural conditioning rather than ethnicity. All Muslims were
Turkish notwithstanding their ethnicity. 42 This ideological perspective
defined Islam as the “homogenising glue of the Turkish nation” and was
used as a restraint to countervail the influence of Kurdish nationalism.43

37.
Sevda Arslan, Language Policy in Turkey and Its Effect on the Kurdish Language (Aug.
2015) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Western Michigan University) (on file with the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks, Western Michigan University).
38.

Mother-Tongue Education, supra note 31, at 13.

39.

Id.

40.
See Mesut Yegen, The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse, 34 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 555, 555 (1999).
41.
ROBERT OLSON, THE EMERGENCE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM AND THE SHEIKH SAID
REBELLION, 1880–1925 5 (1st ed. 1989).
42.

Yegen, supra note 40, at 557.

43.
Ana Dević & Marija Krstić, The Incentives and Actors of Protests in Turkey and BosniaHerzegovina in 2013, in ‘EVERYWHERE TAKSIM’: SOWING THE SEEDS FOR A NEW TURKEY AT GEZI 59,
61 (Isabel David & Kumru F. Toktamiş eds. 2015).
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Turkish policy towards the Kurdish minority is encapsulated by the
term denial: denial that Kurds exist in Turkey and denial that Kurds are a
distinct group to Turks. This denial has been an underlying notion since the
establishment of modern-day Turkey. 44 During the negotiations for the
Treaty of Lausanne, the Allies sought the inclusion of all minorities,
including ethnic minorities, within the Treaty’s terms.45 However, Turkey
rejected any distinct status for non-Turkish Muslims and defined minorities
on the basis of religion excluding Turkey's numerous ethnic, linguistic and
cultural minorities, specifically the Kurds. 46 It only recognised official
minority status for non-Muslim religious minorities, for example, Greek
Christians, Armenian Christians and Jews.47
Problematically, the Treaty of Lausanne only safeguards rights for
non-Muslim minorities and fails to consider in any way the cultural,
linguistic or ethnic minorities in Turkey, of which the Kurds make up the
greatest proportion of.48 A report by the Human Rights Advisory Board
mandated by the government found that the minority definition used in the
Treaty was too restrictive and recommended that the law be amended to
recognise that minorities exist where groups are ethnically, linguistically
and religiously different. 49 Shortly after, the authors of the report faced
criminal proceedings under Articles 216 (incitement of racial hatred) and
301(denigration of the Turkish nation) of the Penal Code due to their stance
in the report.50
Despite Turkey’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of Kurds as a
distinct ethnicity or to give Kurds formal recognition as minorities, Turkey
offered the semblance of protection of their minority rights through the
affirmative obligations under the Treaty of Lausanne.51 Article 39 assured
“[n]o restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national
of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press,
or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.” 52 It further
44.

INT’L HUM. RTS. L. GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE COMM’N ON SEC. & COOPERATION
(1994).

IN EUR., CRIMINALIZING PARLIAMENTARY SPEECH IN TURKEY 8

45.
HUM. RTS. ADVISORY BOARD, THE MINORITY RIGHTS AND CULTURAL RIGHTS WORKING
GROUP REPORT: OCTOBER 2004 1 (2004) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT].
46.

Id.

47.

Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 11 (referencing art. 39).

48.

Id.

49.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 45, at 2.

50.
EDWARD GRIEVES, KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, SUPPRESSING ACADEMIC
DEBATE: THE TURKISH PENAL CODE - TRIAL OBSERVATION REPORT 1, 22 (Joanna Hunt et al. eds.,
2006).
51.

See Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 11.

52.

Id. at 971 (referencing art. 39).
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guaranteed: “adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of nonTurkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.”53
Turkey has continuously breached the Treaty of Lausanne. 54
However, even strict adherence to it would not comply with contemporary
international standards and the changing expectations; it does not afford
proper legal protection to minorities in Turkey.

1.

Turkish Reform of Minority Rights for European Union
Membership

Turkey formally applied for full membership of the European Union
(EU) in April 1987, and was recognised as a candidate for EU accession in
1997.55 In its endeavour to satisfy the minority protection element of the
EU membership criteria stipulated at the June 1993 European Council in
Copenhagen (Copenhagen Criteria), Turkey legislated various
constitutional and legislative reform laws.56 These reforms sought to grant
ethnic and linguistic minorities some language rights, at least in theory.57
The reforms precipitated greater freedom of expression; ended the ban
of publications and broadcasting in Kurdish and ushered a series of laws for
teaching Kurdish as an elective subject in schools.58 However, Turkey has
avoided any express reference that might indicate official recognition of its
minorities. By demanding restrictive conditions, the Government has made
the implementation of their limited minority rights essentially impossible.
C.

The Birth of the PKK & Kurdish Independence Movements

Due to the dissatisfaction with the lack of change and progress, many
Kurds have taken matters into their own hands to fight the repression by
Turkey and protect their identity. While many Kurdish groups have
emerged in the plight to ameliorate their rights in Turkey, the Kurdistan
Workers' Party Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) has been the most
persistent in their activism.

53.

Id.

54.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 45, at 2.

55.

European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations:
Turkey, EUR.
COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/
turkey_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
56.
European Commission Press Release IP/04/1180, The Commission, Commission
Recommends to Start Negotiations with Turkey Under Certain Conditions (Oct. 6, 2004).
57.
Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURKEY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP (2000).
58.

Dević & Krstić, supra note 43.
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In 1978, Abdullah Öcalan founded the PKK, an armed left-wing
organisation based in Bakur.59 The PKK’s ideology was initially based on
revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. 60 At its
inception, the PKK sought to create an independent, socialist Kurdish state
comprised of all its constituents—Bakur, Bashur, Rojhalat and Rojava—to
be known as Kurdistan. 61 However, since Öcalan’s capture and
imprisonment in 1999, the PKK’s objective has been moderated to asserting
cultural and political rights as well as self-determination for the Kurds in
Bakur; the urge for the establishment of a fully independent state has been
abandoned.62
Öcalan’s imprisonment has become a defining factor of the Kurdish
struggle. Many PKK members, supporters and sympathisers have insisted
that Öcalan’s freedom would epitomise the freedom of Kurds.63 However,
the reality is that the prospect of Öcalan’s release from prison, absent a
special amnesty, is non-existent.64 Öcalan is no longer facing death row as
the Turkish legislature revoked the death penalty in 2002 as part of the
array of reforms in preparation for EU accession.65 Thus, his sentence was
reduced to life imprisonment. 66 In 2005, in his appeal regarding the
fairness of his trial, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in his
favour, however, Turkey rejected its findings on the grounds that the ruling
was not binding on Turkey.67
During his time in prison, Öcalan’s ideology underwent a
transformational shift and he led the PKK to adopt a new political platform
of “Democratic Confederalism.” 68 According to Öcalan, Democratic
Confederalism is not modelled on or controlled by a state system; it is a
non-state social paradigm.69 He states “[t]his kind of rule or administration
59.
Tom Anderson & Eliza Egret, Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan, CORP. WATCH
(Apr. 18, 2016, 16:05), https://corporatewatch.org/news/2016/apr/18/democratic-confederalism-kurdis
tan.
60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.
8 HUSSEIN TAHIRI, THE STRUCTURE OF KURDISH SOCIETY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A
KURDISH STATE 243 (2007).
63.

Aliza Marcus, Turkey’s PKK: Rise, Fall, Rise Again?, WORLD POL’Y J., Spring 2007, at

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

75, 83.

68.
ADEM UZUN, “LIVING FREEDOM”: THE EVOLUTION OF THE KURDISH CONFLICT IN
TURKEY AND THE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE IT 22 (Véronique Dudouet & Luxshi Vimalarajah eds., 2014).
69.

Id. at 21.
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can be called a non-state political administration or a democracy without a
state.”70 Democratic Confederalism centres on grass-roots participation and
decision-making within the communities.71 He asserted that we should not
leave history to the United Nations (U.N.) concept of the nation-state but
should instead formulate alternative modes of ordering.72
Over time, the PKK has grown more diverse and today is better
understood as a party-complex—a configuration of parties and
organisations encompassing numerous parties and their guerrilla forces.73
In 2007, the Association of Communities in Kurdistan—Koma Civakên
Kurdistan (KCK)—was established in accordance with the new political
trajectory. 74 KCK is a societal organisation of Kurds from all regions
embodying Öcalan’s Democratic Confederalism and presents itself as an
alternative to the concept of the nation-state.75 The KCK is essentially a
network of village, city and regional councils across Kurdish zones whose
legislative body is called the Kurdistan People’s Congress—Kongra-Gel.76
With a focus on organising from the bottom up through village, town,
and city council assemblies, the Democratic Confederalism is a movement
“which struggles to establish its own democracy, neither grounded on the
existing nation-states nor seeing them as the obstacle.”77 Öcalan envisages
the KCK as model for the resolution of Kurdish problems through a new
political paradigm.78
D.

Continuing Armed Conflict in Turkey

Since its inception, the PKK has successfully mobilised a great
proportion of the Kurdish population in Bakur. 79 The first armed

70.

ABDULLAH ÖCALAN, DEMOCRATIC CONFEDERALISM 21 (Int’l Initiative, trans., 1st ed.

71.

Id. at 26.

2011).
72.
See ABDULLAH ÖCALAN, PRISON WRITINGS III: THE ROAD MAP TO NEGOTIATIONS 83–
89 (Havin Guneser, trans., 1st ed. 2012).
73.
Joost Jongerden & Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, Democratic Confederalism As A Kurdish
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insurgency launched by the PKK against Turkey began in 1984. 80 Ever
since, there have been various periods of ceasefires ranging in length and
subsequent revocations of the ceasefire when the PKK believed their
attempts to negotiate with the Government about the long-disenfranchised
Kurdish minority were continuously ignored.81 On July 25, 2015, the PKK
announced the end of the most recent ceasefire stating that Ankara had
welched on its promises.82 Violence subsequently spread in the wake of
resurgence throughout Turkey by the PKK and the Government.83
Since the war between the PKK and Turkey began in 1984, over
40,000 people have been killed and the Government forcibly evacuated
more than 3000 Kurdish villages, resulting in the destitution of 3 million
people.84
The changing international circumstances that arose out of the 9/11
terrorist attacks had severe repercussions internationally. It had immense
impact on the EU’s engagement regarding the PKK and Turkey.85 “[T]he
European Council [proclaimed] the ‘fight against terrorism’ as a priority
objective and [released] a list of ‘persons, groups and entities involved in
terrorist acts.’”86 PKK is now listed as a terrorist organisation by a number
of states and organisations internationally, including the EU 87 and the
United States (U.S.).88
Despite that the armed insurgency instigated by the PKK being a result
of—rather than cause of—the war between Turkey and the Kurds, the
violence has overshadowed the roots of the war, allowing Turkey to frame
it solely as counter-terrorism.89 This allows Turkey to disguise its human

80.
John Pike, Kurdistan Workers’ Party, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS: INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE
PROGRAM, https://fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm (last updated May 21, 2004).
81.
See generally Gareth Jenkins, PKK Changes Battlefield Tactics to Force Turkey into
Negotiations, TERRORISM FOCUS, Oct. 24, 2007.
82.
PKK Group Says Turkish Ceasefire Over, RUDAW:
http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/120720151.

MIDDLE E. (Dec. 7, 2015),

83.
PKK Ends Unilateral Cease-Fire with Turkey, ALJAZEERA AM. (Nov. 5, 2015, 12:08
PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/5/pkk-ends-unilateral-ceasefire-with-turkey.html.
84.

Id.; Turkey-Kurds, supra note 1.

85.
Dilek Kurban, Europe As an Agent of Change: The Role of the European Court of Human
Rights and the EU in Turkey’s Kurdish Policies, STIFUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK: GERMAN INST.
FOR INT’L & SEC. AFFAIRS, Oct. 2014, at 1, 18.
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Id. (citing 2001 O.J. (L 344) 93).
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2009 O.J. (L 151) 45.

88.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/
other/des/123085.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
89.

Kurban, supra note 85, at 5.
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rights violations in Bakur behind the cover of counter-terrorism.90 Instead
of addressing the rights of Kurdish minorities, Turkey’s persistent focus on
enforcing counter-terrorism policies against the PKK equates to a refusal to
address the root causes of the conflict. An unescapable cycle currently
exists whereby the Government attempts to quash Kurdish insurgency,
despite the fact that this insurgency is itself a reaction to Turkey’s lack of
recognition of Kurdish rights.
This section has demonstrated that despite the actions of Kurdish
independence movements, Kurds in Turkey have been consistently
oppressed, targeted and marginalised as a minority both historically and
today. Kurds are still not recognised and protected as a minority by Turkey
despite Turkey’s semblance of commitment to reform. Hence, it must be
recognised that the panacea to the conflict is likely linked to better human
rights for Kurds in Turkey and this can be achieved through selfdetermination.
IV.

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ANALYSIS

“Behind all law is someone’s story; someone whose blood, if you read
closely, leaks through the lines. Text does not beget text; life does. The
question—a question of politics and history and therefore law—is whose
experience grounds what law?”91
This section adopts a human rights law analysis as an attempt to
remedy the situation for Kurds in Turkey. Key international instruments
will be examined to identify Turkey’s international obligations to protect
minorities. Lastly, the shortcomings of Turkish law in protecting its
minorities will be analysed to support the case that self-determination is the
best solution for Kurdish minorities whose rights have been abused.
Under international law, Turkey is obliged to guarantee rights to its
minority population.92 It is a party to many international conventions and
instruments that oblige Turkey to protect and promote minority rights. 93
The rights which are of particular concern to Kurdish minorities in Turkey
and which are systematically abused are the right to self-determination,
90.
Turkey: UN Human Rights Council Should Address Continuous Deterioration of
Freedom of Expression and Other Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 17, 2017, 6:13 AM), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/17/turkey-un-human-rights-council-should-address-continuous-deterioratio
n-freedom.
91.
59 (1993).

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 59,

92.
KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT SUBMISSION TO
COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 11, ¶ 13 (May 2010) [hereinafter
KHRP].
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93.
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right to education, right to take part in cultural life, freedom of expression,
freedom of association, right to life and the right not to be subject to torture
or degrading behaviour.94
While Turkey is state party to various international instruments, it has
been reticent to become a party to binding international standards protecting
minority rights. 95 However, many fundamental rights safeguarding
minority culture and language are identified in various key international
instruments to which Turkey is a party, so it cannot escape international law
frameworks entirely.96
International human rights law is governed by “the International Bill
of Human Rights which comprises the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights [UDHR], the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights [ICESCR], and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights [ICCPR] and its two Optional Protocols.”97 Turkey is a
party to all these international human rights instruments as well as the
European Convention on Human Rights.98
A.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

“The UDHR is a milestone document,” the first in history, to
encapsulate the fundamental human rights to be universally protected. 99
Drafted by representatives from all regions globally with differing legal and
cultural backgrounds, the UDHR was manifested “as a common standard of
achievements for all peoples and all nations.”100
In essence, the UDHR guarantees free participation in the cultural life
of the community.101 It guarantees the right to education and recognises it

94.

See id. at 12–13, ¶¶ 16–17.

95.

Id. at para. 16, p. 12.

96.

See id. at 11–14, ¶¶ 13–21.

97.
Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS OFF.
HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2017).
98.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, 2015 PROGRESS REPORT ON TURKEY 5 (2015), https://ec.
europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_turkey
.pdf [hereinafter 2015 PROGRESS REPORT]; Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties Turkey, U. MINN.: HUM. RTS. LIBR., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-turkey.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2017).
99.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en
/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (alteration in original).

1948).
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as an instrument to “promote understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations, racial or religious groups.”102 The UDHR guarantees the
right to freedom of expression, including “seek[ing], receiv[ing] and
impart[ing] information and ideas through any media . . . .”103 “Turkey was
among the [forty-eight] countries that voted for and signed the [UDHR].”104
While the UDHR is not a binding treaty and only has recommendatory
status, it is mostly like to be seen as evidence of state practice and thus
binding as customary international law on states.
B.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The ICCPR requires state parties to respect the civil and political
rights of individuals in their nation.105 The ICCPR ensures the right of all
peoples to retain their cultural and religious heritage and way of life.106 It
protects the fundamental right to equality.107 It prohibits discrimination or
adverse distinctions based on race, language, religion, political or cultural
opinions, national or social origin.108
The ICCPR and the ICESCR, guarantee the right to self-determination,
namely the freedom to determine political status and economic, social and
cultural development in Article 1.109 State parties are obliged to promote
the realisation of the right to self-determination and respect it in conformity
with the provisions of the U.N. Charter.110 The right to self-determination
is a fundamental provision empowering minorities to determine how they
are governed.
In addition, it also guarantees individuals from minority groups culture
and language rights. The ICCPR prohibits state parties from denying their
minorities the right “in community with the other members of their group,
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
use their own language.”111 The ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of
102.

Id. art. 26.

103.

Id. art. 19.

104. Marlies Casier, Contesting the ‘Truth’ of Turkey’s Human Rights Situation: StateAssociation Interactions in and Outside the Southeast, EUR. J. TURKISH STUD., no. 10, 2009, at 1, 3.
105. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
106.

Id. art. 26.

107.

Id.

108.

Id.

109. Id. art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
110.

ICCPR, supra note 105, at art. 1(3).

111.

Id. art. 27.
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expression, including seeking, receiving and imparting information and
ideas through any media.112
While Turkey ratified the ICCPR in September 2003, it issued a
reservation to Article 27 that this Article would be implemented pursuant to
the Turkish Constitution and the Treaty of Lausanne 1923.113 The effect of
Turkey’s reservation in practice means the exclusion of its application to
Kurds.
C.

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

The ICESCR, another international instrument that Turkey ratified in
2003, guarantees the universal right to take part in cultural life.114 “The
right . . . to take part in cultural life is ‘intrinsically linked’ to the right to
education [in Article 13,] which [empowers] individuals and communities
[to] pass on their . . . language and other cultural references . . . .”115 To
realise these rights, individuals must be able to express themselves in the
language of their choice,116 and to seek, receive and impart information on
all manifestations of culture in the language of their choice.117
Crucially, states must employ measures and “spare no effort” so that
education for minorities is carried out in their own language.118 This arises
from states’ obligations “to recognize, respect and protect minority cultures
as an essential component of the identity of the states themselves.”119 The
ICESCR recognises education as a vehicle that should be used for
strengthening adherence with other fundamental rights and freedoms.120
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
requires states to ensure their education systems are available, acceptable,
accessible and adaptable.121 Essentially, this means that the burden is on
112.

Id. art. 19(2).

113. LAWYERS’ RIGHTS WATCH CAN. & THE OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN
RIGHTS DEF., BRIEFING TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, 106TH SESSION (15 OCT. – 2 NOV.)
GENEVA 2 (2012).
114.

ICESCR, supra note 109, at art. 15(a).

115. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights General
Comment No. 21, at para. 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (2009).
116.

Id. at para. 15(a).

117.

Id. at para. 16(b).

118.

Id. at para. 27.

119.

Id. at para. 32.

120.

ICESCR, supra note 109, at art. 13(1).

121. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights General
Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), at para. 6(a)–(d), U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/10 (1999). [hereinafter General Comment No. 13].
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the state to take affirmative action in ensuring “education is culturally
appropriate for minorities . . . .” 122 The state must ensure education is
accessible to everyone without discrimination both in theory and in
practice, and that it is accessible physically and economically.123 It needs to
be adaptable to the demands of fluid and ever-changing societies and
communities as well as meet the needs of all people within their diverse
social and cultural circumstances.124 These standards posit a strong case for
mother-tongue education.
The ICESCR emphasises the principles of non-discrimination and,
crucially, underline that the right to education must “enable all persons to
effectively participate in a free society . . . .” 125 States should promote
understanding amongst all ethnic, racial and religious groups and ensure
that equal educational opportunities are afforded to all minorities.126
Despite Turkey being a signatory to the ICESCR, it has issued
reservations to interpret and apply the ICESCR provisions regarding
academic freedom consistent with the Turkey Constitution.127 Specifically,
Turkey’s Constitution states that Turkish is the only official language of the
State and denies the right to education in other languages.128 While states
are permitted to choose one or more national or official languages, they are
not permitted to exclude, outside the spheres of public life, the freedom to
express oneself in a language of one’s own choice.129
The CESCR has voiced its concern over Turkey’s reservation and
recommended that Turkey withdraw its reservations to the ICESCR.130 The
CESCR has further recommended that Turkey apply and interpret the
ICESCR taking into consideration the jurisprudence of the CESCR. 131
Pertinent to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state parties
cannot submit a reservation that is “incompatible with the object and

122.

Id. at para. 50.

123.

Id. at para. 6(b).

124.

Id. at para. 6(d).

125.

ICESCR, supra note 109, at art. 13(1).

126.

General Comment No. 13, supra note 121, at para. 30.

127.

Id. at para. 43.

128.
42 (1982).

TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY CONSTITUTION], art. 3,

129. Ballantyne, Davidson & McIntyre v. Canada, CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 & 385/1989/Rev. 1
(Mar. 31, 1993).
130. Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Rep. on Its Forty-Sixth Session, at (C)(6), U.N.
Doc E/C.12/TUR/CO/1 (2011).
131.

Id.
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purpose of the [Covenant].” 132 This would be true of the reservations
Turkey has made to the ICCPR and ICESCR. While Turkey has made
reservations to certain provisions of the ICCPR and ICESCR, the
reservations would only be applicable to the rights found in those
provisions; they would not apply to the same rights that also make up
customary international law.133 States are bound to customary international
law.134
Turkey has still not taken positive measures in the negotiation and
adoption of an optional protocol to the ICESCR. The adoption of an
optional protocol would provide an avenue for victims seeking public
accountability and the possibility of relief in relation to the violations of
individual economic, social and cultural rights at an international level, if
they are denied access to justice domestically.135
D.

European Convention on Human Rights

Turkey is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). 136 The ECHR is pivotal: individuals subject to Turkey’s
domestic law have direct recourse, depending on meeting specific criteria,
to subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR to complain of a violation of
their rights under the ECHR.137
The right to equality is fundamental. However, Turkey has been
reluctant to ratify Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which protects the freestanding right to equality, despite signing it in 2001. 138 The purpose of
Protocol 12 is to promote equality beyond the limited scope afforded by
Article 14.139 Effectively, Protocol 12 supplements Article 14. Article 14
serves as a general prohibition against discrimination; however, it can only

132. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) art. 19(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
133.

Id. art. 21(1); KHRP, supra note 92, at 10.

134.

Customary International Humanitarian Law: Questions & Answers, INT’L COMMITTEE
RED CROSS (Aug. 15, 2005), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/customary-law-q-anda-150805.htm.
135.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 14, ¶ 21.

136. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms n.1, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221.
137. KHRP, supra note 92, at 13, ¶ 20; Human Rights, REPUBLIC TURK. MINISTRY FOREIGN
AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/%C4%B0nsan-haklar%C4%B1.en.mfa (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
138.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 13, ¶ 20.

139.

Id.
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be invoked if a circumstance is within the ambit of a right stipulated under
the ECHR.140
Article 14 imposes an obligation “on the State and public authorities,
acting within the scope of convention rights, not to discriminate on the
[enumerated] grounds or any other status, . . . [without justification].”141
The possibility of justifying discrimination is a weakness which could
diminish the force of the principle.
Some academics have criticised that the ECtHR habitually elects to
decide cases based on other Articles rather than Article 14 even where
discrimination is crucial to the case.142 Article 14 is not a stand-alone right
and is only applicable in accordance with another provision under the
ECHR, thus limiting its potential application.143 It is much narrower in its
scope of application than the ICCPR equivalent in Article 26. 144 Such
weaknesses mark the failure of the ECtHR to embrace a substantive
conception of equality which would confront systematic disadvantage and
oppression.145 This failure underlies Judge Bonello’s dissenting judgment
in Anguelova v. Bulgaria:
Kurds, coloureds, Muslims, Roma and others are again and again
killed, tortured or maimed, but the Court is not persuaded that
their race, colour, nationality or place of origin has anything to
do with it. Misfortunes punctually visit disadvantaged minority
groups, but only as the result of well-disposed coincidence.146

While studies of the ECtHR jurisprudence found that the ECtHR had
taken steps to protect the marginalised in Europe, it still treads carefully.
The studies show that Article 3 and Article 8 were predominantly used for
the protection of the marginalised, rather than Article 14.147
E.

Turkish Constitution

Turkey’s ideology is based on the premise that the citizens’ first duty
is to safeguard the integrity of the Republic. This is incompatible with the
140.

Id.

141. Rory O’Connell, Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the Right to NonDiscrimination in the ECHR, 29 LEGAL STUD.: J. SOC’Y LEGAL SCHOLARS 211, 211 (2009).
142.

Id. at 214.

143.

Id. at 212.

144.

Id.

145.

Id. at 214.
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inclusive and pluralistic culture of democratic tolerance advocated by
international human rights standards. The emphasis of international norms
is on the notion that it is the responsibility of nation states to safeguard the
rights of its citizens. However, the cultural ideology of Kemalist Turkey
demonstrates the opposite of these international standards.148
The fundamental law of Turkey is Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi (the
Constitution).149 As required by international standards, Article 10 of the
Constitution states, everyone is equal before the law without distinction as
to “language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief,
religion and sect, or any such [grounds].”150 However, when read in light
of the Treaty of Lausanne, the prohibition against discrimination is
rendered ineffective in practice in regards to Kurds who are not recognised
as a minority group under the Treaty of Lausanne.151
Article 3 identifies Turkish as the only official language, despite Kurds
constituting a significant proportion of the Turkish population.152 Article
42 emphasises this restriction further, stating “[n]o language other than
Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any
institutions of . . . education.”153 The requirement that education shall “be
conducted along the lines of the principles and reforms of Atatürk . . . under
the supervision and control of the State,” means that even a reformist
administration wanting to advocate for the use of mother-tongue education
is constitutionally bound to embrace a nationalist Turkish State.154
Turkey’s Constitution fails to address minorities and makes no
reference to the word “minority” at all. In Turkey, no legal framework
exists to date for the protection of minorities, whether directly through
legislation explicitly protecting minority rights or indirectly through antidiscrimination laws.155
The lack of a Turkish legal framework on non-discrimination and
minority rights has not been overlooked and has been routinely condemned
by U.N. monitoring bodies. 156 European bodies have also denounced
Turkey’s refusal to safeguard the rights of Kurdish minorities and urged for

148. Thomas W. Smith, Leveraging Norms: The ECHR and Turkey’s Human Rights Reforms,
in UNIV. OF PA. PRESS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 262, 264 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat ed., 2011).
149.

See THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY CONSTITUTION, pmbl. (1982).

150.

Id. art 10.

151.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 11, ¶ 13.

152.

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY CONSTITUTION, art. 3 (1982).

153.

Id. art. 42.

154.

Mother-Tongue Education, supra note 31, at 7.

155.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 10–11, ¶¶ 10–13.

156.

Id. at 10, ¶ 10.
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Constitutional reform.157 The CESCR has urged Turkey to enact legislation
to protect against discrimination consistent with the ICESCR and its
General Comment on non-discrimination.158 The CESCR has also raised
concerns about the lack of a legislative framework for the recognition of all
minority groups in Turkey, and the protection of their rights.159 Indeed, the
CESCR formally called on Turkey to recognise all minorities within its
territory and bestow full opportunities for minorities to enjoy economic,
social and cultural rights.160
While the implementation of rights consistent with international norms
has considerably improved recently, there are still immense shortcomings to
be addressed. 161 Rights standards within international and European
treaties are not fully implemented. There is an urgent need for Turkey to
adopt a comprehensive legal framework on combating discrimination and
protecting minorities in accordance with international standards. Turkey
must adopt a more inclusive definition of minorities that meets international
standards and that includes all minorities, not only non-Muslim minorities
as currently under the Treaty of Lausanne. The Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE) has already proposed the following
definition for minorities:
A group of persons in a state who:
a) Reside in the territory of that State and are citizens thereof . . . ;
b) Maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state;
c) Display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic
characteristics;
d) Are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number
than the rest of the population of the state . . . ; and
e) Are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which
constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their
traditions, their religion or their language. 162

Turkey should adopt this definition of minorities to give effect to
Article 2 of the ICCPR and ICESCR and ensure that Kurds as well as other
minorities are captured under definition.

157.

Id. at 12, ¶ 15.

158.

General Comment No. 13, supra note 121, at para. 2.

159.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 11, ¶¶ 11–12.

160.

See generally General Comment No. 13, supra note 121, at para. 2.

161. 2015 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 98, at 5. The European Commission stated that while
Turkey’s Constitution guarantees the protection of human rights, the enforcement of rights arising from
the ECHR and the case law of ECtHR is not entirely ensured. Id.
162.
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Other Instruments

There are several other key international instruments that Turkey has
either failed to ratify or has ratified but failed to meet which are
fundamental to the protection of Kurds.
Despite international pressure, Turkey has not acceded to the
Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM). Turkey’s
ratification of FCNM is crucial, particularly due to Turkey’s reservation to
Article 27 of the ICCPR and also considering the FCNM is the only
multilateral binding treaty concerning minority rights specifically.163 PACE
has persistently urged Turkey to accede to the FCNM.164
Additionally, Turkey has not ratified the U.N. Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention against Discrimination
in Education 1960, the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages or the European Convention on Nationality. 165 In light of
Turkey’s historical and present relationship with its minority population, its
unwillingness to implement international standards on minority protection
and rights questions sheds uncertainty on the genuineness of its pledge to
respect and uphold minority rights within its jurisdiction.
Using a human rights law analysis, it is thus clear that Turkey is
failing to uphold and sustain international human rights standards in
relation to Kurds in its territory. This status quo cannot go on any longer
and hence I argue that self-determination is the most appropriate legal
framework to change this.
V.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST KURDS IN TURKEY

“[T]here’s really no such thing as the ‘voiceless’. There are only the
deliberately silenced, or the preferably unheard.” 166 Turkey is failing to
comply with their international human rights obligations in guaranteeing
fundamental rights for minorities under their national legal framework, both
in theory and practice. As Kurban has stated: “The crux of the Kurdish
issue remains the structural inequalities against the Kurds . . . . These
inequalities are deeply rooted in Turkey’s authoritarian political regime and

163.

KHRP, supra note 92, at 13, ¶ 18.

164. KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, KHRP SHADOW REPORT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDER CERD 39 (2009).
165. U.N. EDUC. SCI. CULTURAL ORG., Universal Periodic Review, on Its Twenty-First Session
(Jan. 27, 2015); Council of Eur., Cong. of Local and Reg’l Authorities, Local Democracy in Turkey,
Rec. 229 (Nov. 20, 2007), https://rm.coe.int/1680719b53.pdf.
166. Arundhati Roy, Peace & the New Corporate Liberation Theology, CTR. FOR PEACE &
CONFLICT STUD., no. 04/2, 2004, at 1, 1.
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can only be addressed through structural reforms aimed at establishing
substantive democracy and the rule of law.”167
This fundamentally stems from Turkey’s persistent reluctance to
recognise minority groups, largely due to an ingrained fear of disunity of
the nation state. Turkey’s refusal to officially recognise minority rights
renders the guarantees stipulated in the Constitution futile. This is
exacerbated by the broad restrictions entrenched in the Constitution on
protecting Turkey’s indivisibility and unity, an instrument which could be
exploited to stifle any perceived indication of separatist intention by the
Kurds.168
The escalation of violence in the Kurdish regions of Turkey has raised
significant concerns over human rights violations. The ECtHR has found
that since September 2014 Turkey “violated the ECHR in [ninety-two]
cases [pertaining] mainly to the right to life, prohibition of torture, right to a
fair trial, right to respect for family life, freedom of expression, freedom of
thought, conscience and religion and right to liberty and security.”169
The fundamental rights of Kurds need to be strengthened in Turkey
both in law and in practice. Turkey insists that it places great significance
on the preservation of cultural heritage. It claims that tolerance and
diversity are core notions underlying its policy and that these are protected
by the fundamental rights to “freedom of religion and conscience, freedom
of thought and opinion, freedom of expression and dissemination of
thought,” freedom of press, “protection of the historical, natural and
cultural heritage, and the promotion of arts.”170 While human rights are
safeguarded in theory under the Constitution, in practice these rights are
applied discriminatorily when they concern Kurds.171 Existing violations of
human rights in Turkey include:
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2015 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 98, at 61.
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a) The lack of protection of Kurdish language and cultural rights;
b) The exploitation of terrorism laws used to imprison members
and sympathisers of legal Kurdish parties, students and
journalists, for which there is usually insufficient evidence of
violent activity;
c) The lack of accountability to date for breaches for thousands
of causes of torture, forced disappearances and the death of
civilians by state officials throughout the 1990s within the
background of the conflict between the Government and the
PKK.172

As discussed in Section III above, Turkey still denies the constitutional
existence of Kurds and has systematically failed to protect its Kurdish
minority population. A plethora of reports by various organisations
dedicated to observing human rights compliance provide conclusive
evidence of the extent to which malpractice and discriminatory laws have
contributed to mass human rights violations against the Kurds. 173 The
apparatus of the state has contributed to an atmosphere of lawlessness and
impunity of the abuse of human rights violations against the Kurds.
ECtHR has consistently condemned Turkey for its abysmal human
rights record.174 During the ECtHR’s fifty-year history, Turkey has had the
highest number of violation judgments against it; more than any of the other
forty-six signatory states to the ECtHR.175 Turkey was ranked the highest
for convictions for rights violations by the ECtHR from 1959 to 2011.176
Many cases before ECtHR and the European Commission have a concerned
trend of extensive and systematic human rights abuses against Kurds by the
Turkish state and its agents.177
The cases are predominately focused geographically and ethnically, in
Kurdish regions and related to either Kurdish victims or Kurdish cause
supporters.178 In the decade following 1999, Turkey was found in breach of
human rights in essentially all of the 1700 cases brought against it before
172.

See id. at 1–50.

173.

See, e.g., id.

174. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011 78 (2012) (noting
human rights cases against Turkey).
175. KURDISH HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, IMPACT REPORT 28 (2009) [hereinafter KHRP
IMPACT REPORT]
176. Turkey Ranks First in Violations in Between 1959–2011, BIANET: ENG. (May 15, 2012,
8:18), http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/138337-turkey-ranks-first-in-violations-in-between-19592011.
177. See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (discussing torture of a member of
PKK in Bakur).
178.
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the ECtHR.179 The ubiquitousness of human rights violations against Kurds
are indicative of widespread practice and illustrate how human rights
violations by Turkey are carried out disproportionately against the Kurdish
minority.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of human rights violation cases
against it, Turkey continues to routinely engage in repressive measures in
the face of what it deems a threat to the state’s unity: the manifestation of
Kurdish cultural and linguistic identity and their plight for rights and selfdetermination.180 Turkey’s insistence on linguistic and cultural unity and
the goal of establishing an immensely homogeneous state make it difficult,
to recognise a legitimate space for ethnic diversity and thus lie at the root of
the conflict.181
Turkey has repeatedly, and continues to, violate the human rights of
Kurds living in its territory. Turkey thus fails to meet international human
rights standards both in theory and law, and in practice. Hence, I will now
argue that the right to self-determination is the best solution for Kurds to
determine their future and end the injustice against them.
VI.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

“Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle
of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”182 Given
their common background, history, language and culture, Kurds qualify as a
distinct group in Turkey and have the right to self-determination. The right
to self-determination needs to be recognised under both Turkish law and
international law. This section will analyse self-determination as a
fundamental principle under international law. It will set out the legal
criteria which must be satisfied for a claim to self-determination, namely
what constitutes a people, to make the case that Kurds meet the legal
definition of a distinct “people” and thus have a right to self-determination.
A.

Self-Determination Under International Law

The right of nations to self-determination is a fundamental principle in
international law.183 It is considered a rule of customary international law
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and is deemed as an erga omnes principle by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).184
Self-determination was introduced by Woodrow Wilson after World
War I. 185 Wilson likened self-determination to the American ideal of
democracy and advocated it as the “foreign extension of American norms
of political fairness.”186 It has since been recognised as a universal right of
peoples to be free from domination by oppressors.187 The U.N. Charter
states that nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and fair
equality of opportunity, have the right to freely choose their sovereignty
and international political status with no interference.188 The notion of selfdetermination is deemed an “inalienable” right of all peoples or an
“essential condition” for the effective guarantee and the observance of
individual human rights.189
The right to self-determination can be defined as “the capacity of
people to control and participate in decision making in determining their
political status, in pursuing their economic, social, and cultural
development, and disposing of their natural wealth and resources.” 190
States are required to implement this right and to facilitate its realisation.191
This obligation became more pressing when the U.N. Human Rights
Committee (HRC) required state parties to the ICCPR and the ICESCR to
report on “the constitutional and political processes which in practice allow
the exercise of this right.”192
Under international law, the right of distinct “peoples” within
sovereign states to self-determination is recognised and their cultural,
physiological, linguistic and religious differences from other groups in a
given territory may be determinative of their status as a “peoples.” 193
184.
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186. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE
J. INT’L L. 177, 180 (1991).
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International treaties have upheld the right by reference to it as the right of
peoples to self-determination. 194 Article 1(1) of the ICCPR and the
ICESCR stipulate, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”195 Article 1(3) of
the ICCPR and ICESCR say that State Parties “shall promote the realisation
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right . . . .”196
Generally, under international law, no state or group of people have
the right to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another state.
A state’s sovereignty is pivotal. However, “self-determination [can
override] territorial integrity when a [state] has: i) violated the “economic,
social, and cultural development” of a people . . . ; and ii) the people have a
valid territorial claim to the area that they wish to claim.”197
Many issues stem from the ambiguity around the right to selfdetermination. It is unclear how the decision in relation to selfdetermination is to be made, how the right is realised, or what the outcome
should be—whether it should be independence, federation, protection, some
form of autonomy or full assimilation. Neither the U.N. Charter nor the
international treaties define what constitutes a nation for the purposes of the
right to self-determination.
There are irreconcilable definitions and legal criteria for deciding
which groups have a legitimate claim to self-determination. Professor
Alfredsson argues that the term “nation” was replaced with “peoples” by
the U.N. for a practical rationale as the former was too ethnically loaded,
although the two terms can be used interchangeably.198 International law
implies the solution is all in the label; if a group is labelled a “people” then
the right to self-determination exists, if a group is labelled a “minority” then
it does not. 199 Ultimately, these definitions can have severe legal

194. Self Determination (International Law), LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cor
nell.edu/wex/self_determination_international_law (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
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197. Philip S. Hadji, The Case for Kurdish Statehood in Iraq, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 513,
521 (2009).
198. Ulrike Barten, What’s in A Name? Peoples, Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, Tribal
Groups and Nations 14 J. ETHNOPOLITICS & MINORITY ISSUES EUR. 1, 13 (2015) (citing Gudmundur
Alfredsson, Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and Peoples: Definitions of Terms as a Matter
of International Law 163, 170, in MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS, MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELFDETERMINATION (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005).
199. Id. at 2 (citing Karin Lehmann, To Define or Not to Define: The Definitional Debate
Revisited, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 509, 515–16 (2007)).
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repercussions.200 The failure of states to grant a group rights is an issue
requiring better classification of groups. 201 Specifically, in relation to
minorities, the lack of an encompassing definition is misused as a
justification for not granting them the appropriate rights.202
B.

The Requirement of A Distinct Group

For a group of people to attain the right to self-determination, they
have to be sufficiently “distinct” as a people.203 The criteria for whether a
people can attain this distinctiveness can be split into objective elements
and subjective elements.204 The traditional two-prong test first examines
the objective elements of the group to ascertain the extent of the shared
“common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history and
cultural heritage” of the group.205 Secondly, to satisfy the subjective prong
of the test, the group members have to individually perceive themselves
collectively as a distinct “people.”206 Some academics within international
law discourse have defined peoples and nations using two very different
methods: the “territorial approach” and the “characteristics approach.”207
Each of these methods will be discussed in turn.

1.

The Territorial Approach

The territorial approach focuses on persons within a defined territory,
often the territory of a nation-state and identified them as a “people.”208 “A
people [means] one territory or one state with one people.”209 In using the
territorial approach to defining a “people,” it is necessary to distinguish
three key elements associated with self-determination: “the situation on the
ground [or the reality], the theory and the practice.”210 While you would
expect reality and state practice to intersect, it is not always so with this
approach.
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“The [notion] of self-determination was stipulated in the U.N. Charter
and [enacted within] the context of the decolonisation of Africa.”211 The
situation on the ground in Africa is clear in that sense that prior, during and
following decolonisation, all concerned states were multi-national. 212
Crucially, prior to decolonisation, the colonies were also multinational.213
At this point, practice during decolonisation was to endow the right of selfdetermination to peoples based on territorial grounds.214
Following the first ripple of decolonisation, the right to selfdetermination was denied to groups in the recently independent states on
the basis that they had already implemented that right in achieving
independence.215 “Theoretically, [the right to] self-determination became
international law [when it was elucidated] in the U.N. Charter.” 216
“However, General Assembly Resolution 1541 [fleshed out] selfdetermination and decolonisation.” 217 U.N. resolutions and international
treaties clarify that it is possible for any one territory to have several
peoples existing within its parameters, specifically by referring to “a
territory and its peoples.”218

2.

The Characteristic Approach

In contrast, the characteristics approach identifies a “people” by
reference to the common characteristics of its constituent members. 219
“This means many peoples could exist within the same territory.”220 Under
this approach, group composition and common characteristics ascertain the
group’s category and whether they qualify for particular rights. 221
According to UNESCO, the common characteristics determining a
“people” can be, but are not limited to, “a common historical tradition,
racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or
ideological affinity, territorial connection, and common economic life.”222
211.
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To be identified as a “people,” the group needs to be “more than a
mere association of individuals within the [s]tate,” however there is no
prerequisite about how large the group must be.223 Furthermore, UNESCO
stipulated that holistically the group “must have the will to be identified as
a people . . . or the consciousness of being a people” and “have institutions
or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for
identity.” 224 While the UNESCO criteria were written by experts and
continues to have force in academia, it has never been adopted
internationally.225
A “people” can be determined by either of the aforementioned
approaches. Pursuant to the territorial approach, every state that has
seceded, following the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, has breached international law.226 “The
territorial approach does not [accept] secession, [because] there can only be
one people in one state.”227 In reality, we know that most states are not
homogenous and are actually comprised of more than one group—who may
be different culturally, ethnically and/or religiously.228 Therefore, I argue
that an approach that takes all common characteristics into consideration
when defining a “people” is pivotal if international law is to be relevant or
applicable practically. The characteristics approach, which looks at the
defining characteristics of a people, is very similar to the way minorities are
defined.229
C.

Minorities

International law is lacking in terms of providing a clear binding
definition of the term “minority.”230 Today, the most prevalent definition of
a minority continues to be the definition Fransceso Capotorti, the then U.N.
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, proposed in 1977 in relation to
Article 27 of the ICCPR:
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A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a
State, in a non-dominant position, whose membersbeing
nationals of the Statepossess ethnic, religious or linguistic
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population
and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or
language.231

The territorial approach has limited relevance in defining a minority; it
is relevant primarily in considering whether a group is settled
predominantly in a region or whether its constituent members are dispersed
over regions as this can affect their rights.232 For example, if the Kurds are
deemed a minority then the territorial approach is relevant to determining
that its members are spread across four states and consequently this affects
the realisation of their rights.
The implication for minorities in practice is that even if a binding
definition was adopted, the existence of a minority simply due to a legal
definition is not in itself sufficient. A state needs to recognise the group as
a minority and their rights. While there is no condition that a state must
recognise the minority for the theoretical definition, practically, without
state recognition, definitions are rendered meaningless. Thus, there is an
apparent gap between practice and theory. Generally, the view was that a
definition of the term “minority” was a sine qua non to ensuring the
international protection of minorities is a workable regime in practice; there
are, however, proponents of the idea that theory is superfluous and what
matters is that minorities realise their rights.233
The former United Nations Working Group on Minorities stipulated
that individuals of an ethnic group may seek protection under minority
rights and they may, when acting as part of a group, assert claims pertinent
to the right to self-determination.234
A determinative factor in minorities realising their rights is the state in
which they live in. While minority rights derive from international law, the
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state maintains responsibility for guaranteeing them. Without state
recognition, minorities are bereft of their minority rights.235
D.

Indigenous Peoples

In international law, the crux of the definition of an “indigenous
people” is whether a group considers itself as distinct from other groups,
whether there is a shared common ancestry with the occupants of a given
territory before its domination by another group or series of groups,
whether they live in a specific geographic area, and whether they share a
language, culture, and history.236 A people’s indigenous status stems from
them inhabiting a region before other settlers moved in as a result of
conquest, occupation, colonisation endangering the indigenous peoples’
livelihoods and very existence.237
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) recognises indigenous peoples’ right to unrestricted selfdetermination. 238 The right to self-determination includes the right “to
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.”239 Article 4 ensures indigenous peoples’
right “to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal
and local affairs,” and Article 5 safeguards their right “to maintain and
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural
institutions.”240 Article 26 states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right
to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired,” and it requires states to give legal
recognition to these territories.241
In addition to UNDRIP, international human rights law contained in
other treaties and international legal materials such as the ICCPR and
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ICESCR also guarantee indigenous peoples the right of cultural and
religious self-determination.242
The right to self-determination is guaranteed in international law;
however, the legal requirements, definitions and categorisation of groups
are pertinent to establishing a claim to self-determination. The law on selfdetermination is appropriate to apply to the Kurds in Turkey who have been
denied their fundamental rights and I will apply it in the following section.
VII.

APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

“Self-determination denotes the legal right of people to decide their
own destiny in the international order.”243 The right to self-determination
has been guaranteed for distinct “peoples” and indigenous peoples,
however, the same right does not extend to minority groups.244 I believe
there is a compelling case for applying self-determination to Kurds and that
the test for self-determination can be substantiated regardless of which
category is used. Kurds satisfy the criteria for a “peoples”—a minority and
indigenous peoples—and have the right to self-determination. In this
section the historical application of self-determination will be examined and
then Turkey’s stance on self-determination. Lastly, I will apply selfdetermination to Kurds and stipulate the specific demands of selfdetermination by Kurds.
A.

Historical Application of Self-Determination

Self-determination rights have been bestowed through various forms
such as independence or at the very least autonomy to many peoples whom
were subject to Ottoman imperialism including, the Armenians, Israelis,
Lebanese, Iraqis, Syrians, Jordanians, and Saudi Arabians.245
The right to self-determination has also been extended to many
peoples that were living within nation states that were established following
World War II. 246 When the principle of self-determination was first
introduced following the Great War, it was applied solely to nations and
envisaged in its internal form.247 However since World War II, there has
been a shift in the way the right is perceived and it has become a right for
peoples.
The way self-determination has been stipulated through
242.
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international law more recently, it appears it is mostly applicable to peoples
and indigenous peoples; there is limited discourse around the right of
minorities to self-determination.
“The [nexus] between minority rights and the right to selfdetermination [is legitimised pursuant to the fulfilment] of the principle of
substantive equality, human rights, the right to identity and culture, and
self-determination’s [significance] for democratic governance.” 248 Selfdetermination can be realised through numerous avenues ranging from
actual participatory democracy to legal pluralism in which rights such as
the right to cultural, linguistic, and political autonomy are exerted.249 An
analysis of the principle of self-determination, historically, illustrates an
indissoluble connection between indispensability for minority protection
and the right to self-determination. This connection became increasingly
apparent in the International Committee of Jurists’ advisory report in
relation to Åaland Islands where the protection of minorities and the right to
self-determination were deemed as embracing “a common object to assure
to some national [g]roup the maintenance and free development of its
social, ethnical or religious characteristics.”250
B.

Turkey’s Stance on Self-Determination

In Turkey, there is currently no reference to the right to selfdetermination in the Turkish Constitution or any other legislation. Even
where rights exist in international law, the realisation of those rights depend
on the state. Without Turkey’s recognition, Kurdish are bereft of their
rights. In the international arena, Turkey’s political and legal stance
regarding the right to self-determination and minority rights has been
unreceptive to changes in international law.
Turkey has a tendency to refuse to adopt or ratify internationally
binding instruments that entail rights of people to self-determination,
reassert the rights of minority groups as a separate legal category, or are
international documents predominantly dealing with minority rights. 251
Turkey has not adopted “the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages, 1992, the Framework Convention on National Minorities, 1995,
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or the ECHR’s Optional Protocol 12 on discrimination.”252 Furthermore,
Turkey has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 2005, which is
concerned with “[t]he protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural
expressions . . . the recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all
cultures, including the cultures of persons belonging to minorities and
indigenous peoples.”253
Even when it has adopted international binding instruments, Turkey
has been sure to make reservations in the face of anything that would
constitute minority protection, reserving its right to interpret and apply the
provisions of any treaty or document in accordance with the Constitution of
the Republic of Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne. 254 Practically, this
means it limits the application of any international protection to those
identified in the Constitution as minorities such as the Greeks, Armenian
and Jews, and rejects the potential application to the unrecognised
minorities in Turkey, such as the Kurds, Alevis and Romas.
Turkey’s reservations to Article 1(1), which appear both in the
ICESCR and the ICCPR, state that it will perform its obligations under
those Covenants in accordance with the obligations under the U.N.
Charter. 255
Ultimately, Turkey accepts “self-determination” as a
“principle,” however, denies “self-determination” as a “right” and confines
its application to colonial territories.256 Through its denial of the right to
self-determination as a “right,” Turkey seeks to evade its legal implications,
which require states to take action towards fulfilling the right to selfdetermination.257
Turkey has persistently denied the relevance of self-determination to
democracy. A study on Turkey’s voting patterns in the U.N. General
Assembly revealed that Turkey also routinely denied the relevance of selfdetermination to groups within states.258 During voting in the U.N. General
Assembly for strategies connecting the right of peoples to selfdetermination and protection of substantive human rights, Turkey either
voted against or remained absent.259
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Turkey has also voted against, or abstained from voting for, any
resolution before the General Assembly advocating the protection of
cultural rights or the collective facets of human rights.260 Turkey’s attitude
to the right to self-determination demonstrates that it takes case-specific and
very political stances. There have been scenarios where Turkey has
willingly backed the right to self-determination, for example in the case of
Northern Cyprus, or has manifested support for the exercise of selfdetermination, for example in the case of Kosovo.261 The Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ said it would render its full support in “developing a
positive and constructive dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia” in response
to the ICJ’s advisory opinion that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is
legal under international law.262 Turkey’s support of self-determination in
the context of Kosovo may be attributed to the equivocal nature of the ICJ’s
advisory opinion.
The most prevalent method the Government has used to persistently
deny the Kurds their right to self-determination is the criminalisation of
political and civil society organisations promoting Kurdish rights and
freedoms.263 The Government, through associating political support for the
Kurds with separatism, has taken advantage of the anti-terror laws to
prohibit pro-Kurdish parties, remove them from positions in the political
system and justify their subsequent arrest.264 This strategy of outlawing
peaceful and genuine Kurdish political parties, systematically, has been
used by the government from the early 1970s and has curbed the ability of
Kurdish parties to effectively and meaningfully participate in the Turkish
political system.265
C.

Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the Right to Self-Determination

Within the Turkish legal system, the perspective on the right to selfdetermination is encapsulated by the judgments of Turkey’s highest court,
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the Turkish Constitutional Court—Anayasa Mahkemesi (AYM) on political
party closures.
These cases arose when a series of Kurdish political parties were
closed down for insisting on the right to self-determination and striving for
rights including legal protection of their culture and language. 266 They
urged for a resolution to the “Kurdish problem” with proposals ranging
“from federation, territorial autonomy to devolution of power.” 267 The
AYM’s main rationale for the closure of Kurdish political parties was
grounded in Article 3 of the Constitution which states, “The Turkish State,
with its territory and nation, in an indivisible entity.” 268 Article 3 is
considered so important that it cannot be amended nor can its amendment
even be proposed, as set out in Article 4.269
The phrase “the state’s indivisible unity with its nation and territory”
[has been labelled a substitute] for the unitary state system.270 The phrase is
repeated throughout the Constitution and is identified as “one of the
fundamental aims of the state in [Article 5].”271 Articles 14, 26 and 28
stipulate that “the state’s indivisible unity with its nation and territory” can
trump fundamental rights and freedoms for its protection. 272 Anything
contrary to the state’s indivisible integrity with its nation and territory is
banned. 273 Ultimately, Article 3 preserves the notion of “one state, one
nation, one language, one country.”274
Under Article 80 of the Law on Political Parties 1983, political parties
are prohibited from legally demanding and taking action to change the
unitary nature of Turkey. 275 This provision has routinely been used to
collapse pro-Kurdish parties that promote decentralisation. 276 Article 81
states that political parties shall not “maintain that there are minorities in
the territory of Turkey based on differences of national or religious culture,
or race, or language,” and shall not “harm national unity by way of creating
minorities in the territory of the Republic of Turkey through protecting,
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developing or spreading languages and cultures other than the Turkish
language or culture.”277
The AYM has denied the relevance of minority protection and the
right to self-determination to Kurds and has denied their connection to the
safeguarding of human rights and to democracy overall.278 Essentially, the
AYM’s narrow interpretation of the unitary state system has been used as a
lawful justification in undermining Kurds’ demands.279
The AYM’s judgments identify, as one of the aims of the unitary state
concept, the need to prevent the creation of a minority in Turkey.280 In one
judgment, the AYM declared that there is sole sovereignty in a unitary
system, and thus there ought to be only one nation. 281 The concept of
federalism and autonomous regions are incompatible with this notion as
they allow for many sovereignties belonging to various nations.
Sovereignty is a right belonging to the Turkish nation, and not the
people. The Kurds’ only right to sovereignty is being part of the sovereign
Turkey. Thus, separatist ideologies aimed at the creation of a Kurdish
nation bestowed with sovereignty are unlawful.282
To date, the AYM has only referred to the right to self-determination
in its “external aspect [implying] secession.”283 As a result, by equating
self-determination to secession, the AYM has made any claim for the right
to self-determination illegal. 284 The AYM has asserted that discussing
“ethnic differences in a national and a unitary state is [outlawed] by
international law.” 285 Furthermore, “to differentiate between Turks and
Kurds, and seek the . . . right to self-determination for the Kurds . . . [also]
constitutes a breach of international law.” 286 Controversially, it has
neglected the internal aspect of self-determination entirely.
Turkey’s vehement stance towards the closure of any political parties
has been condemned on many occasions by the ECtHR as being in breach
of the ECHR.287 The ECtHR disagrees with Turkey that an alternate system
within a sovereign state such as a federation, autonomous region or the like
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are contrary to democracy.288 Instead, the ECtHR has advocated that they
are in fact consistent with the interpretation of the ECHR. 289 In its
judgment of Socialist Party v. Turkey, the ECtHR held: “It is of the essence
of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and
debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently
organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.”290 Statements
that Kurds have a right to self-determination are not undemocratic; they are
the epitome of democracy.
In contrast to international norms, the AYM has interpreted the right to
self-determination as a “one-off” right to be claimed at a “particular period”
rather than as an on-going right.291 The AYM stated, “The right to selfdetermination is not a new concept . . . . It was dropped from the agenda of
the Turkish Nation with the Lausanne Treaty.”292
The reference to the right being dropped is relevant to the Kurds as the
AYM asserts that they have “used their ‘one-off’ right to self-determination
in Lausanne . . . by agreeing to live within the Turkish state.”293 The AYM
thus denies that the Kurds have any other right to self-determination. 294
More recently, the AYM has taken a more extreme view in its judgment
asserting that there has been no oppression of or any bans against Kurds
and held “the allegation that Kurdish people in Turkey are “oppressed and
exploited on the basis of ethnicity” to be a “fictitious hypotheses.”295
D.

Application of Self-Determination to Kurds

The Kurds meet the objective elements required to attain the legal
right of self-determination based on their common language, religion,
ethnicity, history, and culture. The Kurds share the common language of
Kurdish. While there are four distinctive dialects, the dialects are similar
enough that they are all referred to as “Kurdish.”296 The Kurds in Bakur
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share a common religion—being predominantly Sunni Muslim.297 Lastly,
the Kurds are a distinct ethnicity with a common history. 298 They are a
distinct ethnicity that “dates back to 2000 BC when the first vanguard of
Indo-European-speaking people arrived and settled” in the area known as
“Kurdistan.”299 The Kurds’ struggle for autonomy over thousands of years
shows that, notwithstanding all the turmoil and upheaval in the region, the
Kurds are connected by their heritage and common history than by any
arbitrary borders.
The Kurds also meet the subjective elements of self-determination, as
they perceive themselves collectively as Kurds. The Kurds do not identify
themselves as Turkish and want to have their own Kurdish state. They have
fought endlessly for their rights and freedoms. Given that the Kurds see
themselves collectively as Kurds and have been fighting for autonomy,
there is little doubt that they satisfy the subjective element of selfdetermination.
Pertinent to the definition of “indigenous peoples” in international law,
Kurds satisfy this criterion also. Kurds consider themselves a distinct group
from other groups living in their territory, namely Turks in Bakur, but also
Assyrians, Chaldeans, Iranians and Arabs in Bashur, Rojhalat and
Rojava.300 As the Kurds date back to the twelfth century and occupied a
village deemed one of the oldest villages in the Middle East, prior to the
establishment of modern day Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran, there is evidence
of a shared common ancestry before its domination a series of groups.301
Furthermore, there is a plethora of evidence corroborating that the Kurds
live in a specific geographic area they call “Kurdistan,” that they all speak
Kurdish whether one dialect or another and that they share a rich culture
and history.302 By all accounts, there is compelling evidence to suggest that
the Kurds meet the criteria to be deemed “indigenous peoples” and should
thus be guaranteed the same rights to self-determination.
Axiomatically, the Kurds also meet the criteria for being a minority
people. They are a group numerically inferior to the dominant ethnically
Turkish population in Turkey, maintain a non-dominant position and, while
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being nationals of the Turkish State, possess ethnic and linguistic
characteristics which differentiate them from the rest of the population.
There is strong evidence of a sense of solidarity as envisaged through the
majority support of the PKK which is aimed at ameliorating their minority
status and preserving their culture, traditions and language.
The Kurds as a group, whether deemed indigenous peoples or minority
people, ought to have the right to decide on the form of their national selfdetermination.
This may take the form of autonomy, federalism,
confederalism or independence.
While originally the PKK sought external self-determination as the
only solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question, as the reality of the quest sunk
in they abandoned their secessionist policy. 303 The PKK eventually
transformed their demands to one which could be embraced within the
current nation state structure but which guaranteed territorial and cultural
autonomy for the Kurds.304 As mentioned earlier, Öcalan now suggests a
structure beyond the bounds of the rigid nation-state, consisting of a
democratic
republic,
democratic
autonomy,
and
democratic
confederalism.305
The Kurds have a legitimate territorial claim to the right to selfdetermination. Kurds have inhabited the same territory for thousands of
years. They have survived and retained their distinct culture in the face of
genocide, assimilation, human rights abuses, and suppression at the hands
of their oppressors. They have remained on their homeland despite efforts
to remove them.
When the Treaty of Lausanne failed to include an independent
Kurdistan, Kurds did not acquiesce silently. 306 They have persistently
fought for autonomy and independence across all four regions. 307 Kurds
have a valid claim to the territory.
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The Demands for Self-Determination

On January 11, 2012, various Kurdish political organisations gathered
in Amed and declared their position vis-à-vis the Constitution. 308 They
demanded Turkey constitutionally recognise their right to selfdetermination and the realisation of their right through regional autonomy
under the current state structure and further demanded the protection of
their cultural and linguistic rights. 309 Specifically, their demands are as
follows:
a) The recognition and guarantee of Kurdish peoples’ identity;
b) Compliance with international standards pertinent to the rights
to associate and form political parties using the terms ‘Kurd’
and ‘Kurdistan’ in party names;
c) The recognition of Kurdish as an official language of Turkey,
the guarantee of the free use of the Kurdish language in every
aspect of life—private and public, and the guarantee of
education in the Kurdish language; and
d) Provision of political status for the Kurdish people on the
geography of Kurdistan to guarantee their right to selfdetermination.310

In 2013, the Amed Conference for Democracy and Peace took place
with members across the Kurdish political spectrum congregating to form a
resolution on the position of Kurds.311 They urged for Kurds to be granted
the right to self-determination through autonomy, federation, or
independence on the basis of their own decisions and approval. 312
Additionally, they reiterated the demands previously outlined that the new
constitution ought to grant their ethno-cultural rights and expressed that a
solution to the Kurdish problem cannot be attained without determining
Kurds’ legal status. 313 Therefore, they seek a contemporary democratic
constitution that guarantees the right to full political mobilisation, the use of
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Kurdish as a means of instruction and the recognition of Kurdish as an
official language of Turkey constitutionally.314
The demands by the Kurds require de jure recognition of the Kurds by
the Government as a distinct ethnic group. Furthermore, these Kurdish
demands constitute a challenge to the Turkish legal system, particularly
when taking into consideration that, to date, a myriad of political parties
have been shut down specifically in relation to their claims for the exercise
of the right to self-determination for the Kurds.315
In the absence of democratic decentralisation in Bakur, the ability of
Kurds to participate meaningfully in the creation of national policies and
laws is immensely limited. The creation of a truly representative
decentralised body or bodies in Bakur is fundamental for the realisation of
the right to self-determination by Kurds as elucidated by Article 1 of the
ICCPR and the ICESCR.316
VIII.

THE FUTURE FOR KURDS

This section postulates recommendations for Turkey to implement in
order to meet its legal obligations of protecting Kurds. Furthermore, a
strategy is recommended for the Kurds in Bakur to claim their right to selfdetermination through declaring a federal state and the prospect of a
Kurdish state is touched on.
A.

Recommendations for Turkey

No lasting solution to the Kurdish question can be achieved unless
Kurds gain legal status in Turkey as a distinct and separate group. The
failure to recognise Kurds as a distinct group and the persistent violation of
their human rights epitomises the Government’s embedded culture of
oppression and the marginalisation of Kurds. The lack of a legislative
framework to safeguard minority rights and protect against discrimination
as well as the lack of access to justice domestically reinforce a culture of
repression against Kurds.
Despite being involved in the EU accession process since 1991,
Turkey has failed to address its gross mistreatment of the Kurds. To
achieve lasting peace, it is crucial for Turkey to commit to a genuine
democratic transition by confronting abuses of rights, anti-democratic and
discriminatory practices, and the inequalities which have perpetuated
decades of conflict.
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Turkey must amend its Constitution to strengthen democracy and the
protection of human rights. The Constitution must be consistent with
international law by recognising all minorities within Turkey and protecting
their rights. Further, the Constitution must replicate the ICCPR and
ICESCR in protecting the right to self-determination of peoples. Turkey
must meet the requirements of the international conventions it is a party to,
as identified earlier in this paper. If Turkey has appropriate legal
mechanisms in place, there can be a more legitimate space for Kurds to
exercise their rights and to claim self-determination. However, given
Turkey’s reluctance and lack of commitment to effectuate concrete changes
towards an acceptable standard of human rights and minority protection, the
Kurds cannot rely on the amelioration of their rights any time soon. They
must take urgent action.
B.

The Exercise of Self-Determination

Pertinent to ongoing human rights abuses, pressure against politically
active Kurds, and, in light of the progress made by the Kurds in other
regions, the Kurds in Bakur should claim their right to self-determination
immediately. Given its constituents have succeeded in claiming selfdetermination—in Bashur by establishing an autonomous region in the last
decade, and more recently by the Kurds in Rojava by declaring a federal
state317—Kurds in Bakur should also declare a federal state. By doing so,
the Kurds will have more than just a seat at the table; they can organise
themselves, participate, and engage in decision-making. By empowering
Kurds, they can be champions of change for their own lives.

1.

Earned Sovereignty

Once Kurds in Bakur have claimed self-determination in its internal
form, they can work towards external self-determination—the formation of
an independent state through secession from Turkey. Immediate secession
is not a viable option presently as it may undermine stability in the already
fragile region and thus jeopardise the prospect of sufficient international
support to merit recognition.
The most feasible approach based on the probability of lasting success
and reduction of short-term violence is through the “earned sovereignty”
doctrine. “Earned sovereignty” “entails the conditional and progressive
devolution of sovereign powers and authority from a state to a substate
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entity under international supervision.” 318 Under “earned sovereignty,”
Kurds in Bakur can eventually transition from Turkish authority to an
independent Kurdish state and facilitate a peaceful end to armed struggle.
The successful execution of “earned sovereignty” in ethnic conflicts across
the globe, for example in Montenegro, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland,
indicate its potential application to Kurds in Bakur.319
“Earned sovereignty” has three main elements: shared sovereignty;
institution building; and determination of the final status of the substate
entity and its relationship to the parent state.320 Each will be discussed in
turn.
The first element allows for the state and substate entity to
simultaneously exercise sovereign authority. 321 Through already-existing
organisations such as Kongra-Gel, 322 KCK, 323 and others, and by
establishing a federal state, Kurds in Bakur can demonstrate selfgovernment and satisfy the requirement for shared sovereignty in Turkey.324
The second element requires the substate to collaborate with the
international community to establish the political infrastructure and
government institutions required to manage the greater authority that comes
with effectively governing a sovereign state. 325 Kurds have already
established political infrastructures to facilitate grass-roots participation as
well as a legislative body. With international support, the existing
institutions can be bolstered and more can be established.
The third element can be determined via referendum or negotiations
between the parent state and substate entity, however, the determination of
final status for the substate entity relies on recognition by the international
community. 326 Although recognition is not an element of “earned
sovereignty,” lack of recognition would hinder Kurdistan’s political and
economic ties with other nation-states. Working with the international
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community to achieve independence is a powerful tool for attracting more
support within the international arena. This support is crucial in the
situation where the parent state does not recognise the substate entity, as
evidenced by Kosovo’s successful secession.327
Through the “earned sovereignty” approach, Kurds in Bakur can
achieve their dream of a Kurdish state and end their suffering at the hands
of Turkey. I believe this is the most appropriate solution for Kurds to take
to remedy their situation in Turkey.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The oppression of Kurds is not a new phenomenon. Kurds have been
victims of persistent abuses of their fundamental rights, discrimination,
assimilation and genocide—all aimed at the eradication of their existence.
Notwithstanding their history of persecution, Kurds have not backed down.
Since they were stripped of their right to independence by the Treaty of
Lausanne, Kurds have made concerted efforts to fight for their rights and
have persevered in their plight for independence. Turkey has actively
stifled any attempts by the Kurds to seek protection of their rights and
consistently refused to recognise Kurds as a minority.
In order to end the injustice suffered by Kurds and to afford them
adequate protection as a people, Turkey needs to legally recognise Kurds as
a minority. Turkey’s law has fundamental shortcomings in safeguarding
human rights, rights for minorities and recognising the right to selfdetermination. There is a culture of systemic oppression of Kurds. Turkey
needs a transformation of its laws to comply with international standards.
Despite condemnation from international bodies and the EU, Turkey has
failed to effectuate real changes. The truth remains that there will be no
solution to the Kurdish issue unless Kurds act urgently and for themselves
By claiming their right to self-determination, Kurds can escape the
cycle of suppression and determine their own future. Kurds must play a
central role in their own governance without interference. Once Kurds have
asserted their right to self-determination, Kurdistan is achievable if
strategically pursued through the “earned sovereignty” approach.
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X.

APPENDIX

Marked red on the map of Kurdistan is the Kurdish territory divided
among the states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria.328
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